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### Defend the Locations in WSN from Snoopers

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#### Abstract

In detector network several protocols are exploitation for privacy and preservation of knowledge against aggressor. Such connected data will be manipulate by associate mortal to derive sensitive data like the locations of observe objects and information receivers within the field. Attacks on these elements will considerably undermine any network application. The snoopers, is realistic and may defeat these existing technique. It initial formalizes the situation privacy problems in detector networks underneath this robust mortal model and computes a bound on the communication overhead required for achieving a given level of location privacy. It proposes 2 techniques to produce location privacy to sender-location privacy—periodic assortment and sender simulation—and 2 techniques to produce location privacy to Receiver-location privacy—Receiver simulation and backbone flooding. These techniques give trade-offs between privacy, communication value, and latency. Use of those propose techniques, it improves location privacy for each sender and receiver locations.

**Keywords:** Sensor networks, location privacy.

#### Introduction

A wireless sensor network (WSN) typically consists of a large number of small, multifunctional, and resource strained sensors that are self-organized as a posterior hoc network to watch the physical world [1]. Detector networks are typically used in applications wherever it is troublesome or impracticable to set up wired networks. Examples embody life surround watching, security and military police work, and target tracking.

For applications like military police work, adversaries have strong incentives to snoop on network traffic to get valuable intelligence. Abuse of such information can cause monetary losses or endanger human lives. To guard such data, researchers in detector network security have targeted right smart effort on finding ways in which to produce classic security services like confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and convenience. These are important security necessities, they're inadequate in several applications. The communication patterns of sensors will, by themselves, reveal a good deal of discourse data, which may disclose the situation data of important elements during a detector network. As an example, in the Panda-Hunter situation [15], a detector network is deployed to trace vulnerable large pandas during a bamboo forest. Every panda has associate electronic tag that emits a symptom which will be detected by the sensors within the network. A detector that detects this signal, the sender detector, then sends the situation of pandas to an information receiver (destination) with facilitate of intermediate sensors.

Associate mortal (the hunter) could use the communication between sensors and also the information receivers to find then capture the monitored pandas. In general, any target-tracking detector network is at risk of such attacks. As another example, in military applications, the enemy will observe the communications and find all information receivers (e.g., base stations) within the field. Revealing the locations of the receivers during their communication with sensors could enable the enemy to exactly launch attacks against them and thereby disable the network.

Location privacy is, thus, important, particularly in hostile environments. Failure to guard such data will utterly subvert the meant functions of detector network applications. Location privacy measures, thus, ought to be developed to forestall the mortal from deciding the physical locations of sender sensors and receivers. Due to the restricted energy period of time of powered detector nodes, these ways have to be compelled to be energy economical. Since communication in detector networks is way dearer than computation [23], It uses communication value to live the energy consumption of protocols.

Providing location privacy during a detector network is challenging. First, associate mortal will simply intercept network traffic owing to the utilization of broadcasting for routing packets. He will use data like packet UTC and frequency to perform traffic analysis and infer the locations of monitored objects and information receivers. Second, sensors sometimes have

restricted process speed and energy provides. It's terribly costly to use ancient anonymous communication techniques for concealment the communication between detector nodes and receivers. It ought to realize different means that to produce location privacy that accounts for the resender limitations of detector nodes.

Recently, variety of privacy – preserving routing techniques are developed for detector networks. However, most of them are designed to guard against associate mortal solely capable of eavesdropping on a restricted portion of the network at a time. A extremely driven mortal will simply snoop on the complete network and defeat these schemes. As an example, the mortal might deploy his own set of detector nodes to watch the communications within the target network [17]. This is often very true during a military or industrial spying context, wherever the mortal has robust, probably important, incentives to achieve the maximum amount data as potential from perceptive the traffic within the target network. Given a worldwide read of the network traffic, the mortal will simply infer the locations of monitored objects and receivers. As an example, a vicinity within the network with high activity ought to be near a receiver, whereas a vicinity wherever the packets originate ought to be near a monitored object.

Focus on privacy-preserving communication ways within the presence of a worldwide snooper UN agency contains a complete read of the network traffic. The contributions during this paper are twofold.

- It show that the idea of a worldwide snooper UN agency will monitor the complete network traffic is usually realistic for extremely driven adversaries. It then formalize the situation privacy problems underneath such associate assumption associated apply an analysis supported Steiner trees to estimate the minimum communication value needed to attain a given level of privacy.
- It give the primary formal study of a way to quantitatively live location privacy in detector networks. It then apply the results of this study to guage our planned techniques for location privacy in detector networks. These embody 2 techniques that hide the locations of monitored objects—periodic assortment and sender simulation—and 2 techniques that give location privacy to information receivers—receiver simulation and backbone flooding. Our analysis and simulation studies show that these approaches are effective and economical.

### Existing Approaches

Location privacy has been a vigorous space of analysis in recent years. In location-based services, a user might want to retrieve location-based information while not revealing her location. Techniques such as k-anonymity [2] and personal data retrieval [10] have been developed for this purpose. In pervasive computing, users' location privacy will be compromised by perceptive the wireless signals from user devices [24], [27]. Random delay and dummy traffic are urged to mitigate these issues. Location privacy in detector networks additionally falls underneath the overall framework of location privacy. The mortal monitors the wireless transmissions to infer locations of important infrastructure. However, there are some challenges distinctive to detector networks. First, detector nodes are sometimes battery powered, that limits their purposeful period of time. Second, a detector network is usually considerably larger than the network in sensible home or power-assisted living applications.

Sender-location privacy: Prior add protective the situation of monitored objects sought-after to extend the safety period, i.e., the amount of messages sent by the sender before the article is found by the offender [15]. The flooding technique [20] has the sender node send every packet through various ways to a receiver, creating it troublesome for associate mortal to trace the sender. pretend packet generation [15] creates pretend senders. Whenever a sender notifies the receiver that it's real information to send. The pretend senders are off from the important sender and or so at an equivalent distance from the receiver because the real sender. Phantom single-path routing [15] achieves location privacy by creating each packet walk on a random path before being delivered to the receiver. Cyclic defence [19] creates process ways at varied places within the network to fool the mortal into following these loops repeatedly and there by increase the protection amount. However, of these techniques assume an area snooper UN agency is merely capable of eavesdropping on a little region. a worldwide snooper can simply defeat these schemes by locating the primary node initiating the communication with the bottom station. Recently, many techniques are planned to deal with world eavesdroppers.

Receiver-location privacy: In [6], Deng et al. delineated a method to guard the locations of receivers from an area snooper by hashing the ID field within the packet header. In [8], it had been shown that associate mortal will track receivers by polishing off time correlation and rate watching attacks. To mitigate these 2 forms of attacks, Deng et al. introduced a multiple-parent routing theme, a controlled stochastic process theme, a random pretend path theme, and a hot spots scheme [8]. In [13], redundant hops and faux packets are additional

to produce privacy once information are sent to the receiver. However, these techniques all assume that the mortal may be a native snooper. a worldwide snooper will simply defeat these schemes. as an example, the world snooper solely must establish the region exhibiting a high variety of transmissions to find the receiver. It, thus, concentrate on privacy protective techniques designed to defend against a worldwide snooper.

### Networks and Mortal Model

Sensor networks are a comparatively recent innovation. There ar variety of various varieties of detector nodes that are and still be developed [12]. These vary from terribly tiny, cheap, and resource-poor sensors like SmartDust up to PDA-equivalent sensors with ample power and process capabilities like Stargate. Applications for networks of those devices embody several kinds of watching, like environmental and structural monitoring or military and security surveillance.

It consider a homogeneous network model. within the solid network model, all sensors have roughly an equivalent computing capabilities, power sources, and expected lifetimes. this is often a standard specification for several applications nowadays and can doubtless still be standard moving forward. it's well studied and provides comparatively simple analysis in analysis in addition as straightforward preparation and maintenance within the field.

Although our research will be applied to a spread of sensor platforms, most sensors flee battery power, especially within the forms of potentially hostile environments that are studying. Given this, every detector contains a restricted period and also the network should be designed to preserve the sensors' power reserves. It has been incontestible that sensors use way a lot of battery power transmission and receiving wireless communications than any alternative sort of operation [23]. Thus, focus our evaluation on the amount of communication overhead incurred by our protocols.

For the forms of detector networks that envision, expect extremely driven and well-funded attackers whose objective is to learn sensitive data such as the locations of monitored objects and receivers.

The objects monitored by the network will be important. Such objects may well be troopers, vehicles, or robots in a combat zone, security guards during a protected facility, or vulnerable animals within the wild. If the locations of those objects were glorious to associate mortal, the vulnerable animals may well be captured for profit, security guards may well be evaded to alter stealing of valuable property, and military targets may well be captured or killed. Receivers also are important elements of detector networks. In most

applications, receivers act as gateways between the multihop network of detector nodes and also the wired network or a repository wherever the perceived data is analyzed. in contrast to the failure of a set of the sensors, the failure of a receiver will produce permanent harm to detector network applications. Compromise of a receiver can enable associate mortal to access and manipulate all the knowledge gathered by the detector network, as a result of in most applications, information aren't encrypted when they reach a receiver. In some military applications, associate mortal might find receivers and create the detector network nonfunctional by destroying them. Thus, it's typically important to the mission of the detector network to guard the situation data of monitored objects in addition as information receivers.

It take into account world eavesdroppers. For a driven offender, eavesdropping on the complete network may be a quick and effective thanks to find monitored objects and receivers. There are 2 realistic choices for the offender to attain this. the primary possibility is to deploy his own snooping detector network to pay attention to the target network. Note that, at the present worth for a BlueRadios SMT Module at \$25, the offender wants solely \$25,000 to create a network of 1,000 nodes [3]. Thus, for even moderately valuable location data, this will be well worth the value and hassle. an alternative choice is to deploy some powerful nodes to pay attention to the network. However, owing to the short radio ranges of typical detector platforms, the snooping nodes still ought to be deployed densely enough to sense the radio signals from all detector nodes. Thus, in follow, it should not be ready to cut back the amount of snooping nodes considerably by exploitation powerful devices. Overall, It take into account the primary possibility as a lot of sensible for the mortal.

It's definitely potential that associate mortal deploys sensors to directly sense the objects of his interest, rather than grouping and analyzing the traffic within the original network. However, directly recognizing associate object may be a terribly difficult downside in follow owing to the problem of characteristic the physical options of the objects from background noises. as an example, recognizing a panda is way more durable than sleuthing a packet and estimating some physical options (e.g., RSSI) from this packet. In most eventualities, such sensing downside is just avoided by putting in alittle device (e.g., a detector node) on every object; these tiny devices emit signals from time to time so it will sense them accurately. Thus, locating objects by watching the traffic within the original network becomes way more enticing to the mortal. It take into account our defense successful if the mortal is forced to launch the direct sensing attack.

Though such associate eavesdropping detector network would face some system problems in having the ability to report the precise temporal order and placement of every target network event, do not believe that these would keep the attackers from learning a lot of approximate information values. This type of attacker would be ready to query his own network to work out the locations of observed communications. He might have acceptable sensors that send signals that would then be physically situated. He might equip his sensors with GPS to induce locations or use localization algorithms to avoid the value of GPS [25], [18]. It don't assume that the mortal needs to exactly find every node within the target network. In most cases, a rough plan concerning wherever the important events occurred would be comfortable for the mortal.

It should, thus, be possible to watch the communication patterns and locations of events during a detector network via world eavesdropping. An attacker with this capability poses a big threat to location privacy in these networks. It, therefore, focus our attention to this sort of offender.

### Sender Location Privacy Periodic Assortment

The analysis in Section five shows that the periodic assortment methodology achieves optimum location privacy. additionally, the communication overhead within the network remains constant and is freelance of each the amount of pandas and their patterns of movement. Hence, the main target of our simulation analysis is on the latency and also the packet drop rate once there ar multiple pandas within the field. It set the quantity for periodic assortment. are multiple pandas. It will see that because the variety of pandas will increase, the latency will increase. this is often as a result of the nodes near the bottom station receive multiple reports at an equivalent time, which needs them to buffer the packets. once the amount of pandas grows overlarge, the buffered packets begin being born owing to the restricted size of the queue, and also the latency of the packets that do attain the bottom station becomes stable when an explicit purpose. once the Queue size  $q$  decreases, packets traveling long distances have a high likelihood of obtaining born, creating the latency of the packets that do attain the bottom station smaller. this will be seen by a call in the latency for smaller values of  $Q$  within the figure.

It shows the share of the detected events received by the bottom station. It will see that the share of events received decreases once there ar a lot of pandas within the field. Increasing  $Q$  will definitely increase the share of the events forwarded to the bottom station.

However, when an explicit purpose, increasing  $Q$  won't well raise the packet drop rate, as seen by the little distinction from once  $Q = 5$  to  $Q =$  twenty. On the opposite hand, we tend to see from Fig. three that increasing  $Q$  can considerably increase the latency of packetdelivery. Thus, fairly tiny values of  $Q$  can sometimes gift the simplest trade-off purpose between packet drops and latency. Overall, the ends up in Figs. three and four provides a guideline for configuring the Queue size  $q$  to satisfy varied necessities.

### Sender Simulation

According to the analysis, the situation privacy achieved by the sender simulation approach is decided by the amount of virtual senders simulated within the network. Thus, the main target of our simulation analysis is on what proportion communication value we've got to pay to attain a given level of location privacy .It tend to use these results for instance the potency of the planned technique.

Throughout the simulation, ittend to assume that there's just one panda within the network. Multiple pretend pandas are created and simulated within the field. The initial positions of the pretend pandas are indiscriminately selected . Additionally, assume that the detector network is deployed to handle time period applications. In alternative words, whenever a detector node receives a packet, it'll forward it to following hop as presently as potential. Thus, whereas we tend to set the quantity for periodic assortment as, it tend to set it to ten for sender simulation. In alternative words, in sender simulation, nodes can forward packets 10 times quicker than within the periodic assortment methodology. It implies that the mortal has an equivalent knowledgeabout the panda behavior because the defender and therefore cannot distinguish between pretend pandas and real pandasbased on the ascertained behavior. It shows the communication overhead concerned in sender simulation methodology to attain a given level of privacy. It will see that the communication overhead will increase because the location privacy demand will increase. This figure additionally includes the performance of alternative approaches for any comparison.

### Comparison

It currently compare the planned source-location privacy approaches during this paper with 2 alternative privacy-preserving techniques: phantom single-path routing [15] and proxy based mostly filtering [29]. We concentrate on the situation privacy achieved and also the communication overhead introduced within the following comparison. The overhead of the phantom

single-path routing theme is delineate by a single purpose at the bottom-left corner of the figure, and overheads of the periodic collection and also the proxy based filtering techniques are represented by points on the proper a part of the figure.

In terms of privacy, we've got already shown that none of the previous ways (including phantom single-path routing) will give location privacy underneath the idea of a worldwide snooper. In distinction, both of our methods provide location privacy against a worldwide eavesdropper. The periodic collection method provides the highest level of privacy and is suitable for applications that collect data at a low rate and do not require real-time data delivery, while the sender simulation method can support real-time applications with practical trade-offs between privacy, communication overhead, and latency.

It shows the communication prices concerned indifferent ways. The simulation results are as we'd predict from intuition. The phantom single-path routing technique introduces comparatively very little communication overhead, whereas the amount assortment methodology involves vital however constant communication value for a given period of your time. The sender simulation method provides increasing levels of privacy at the value of more communication. We tend to notice that within the figure, the periodic assortment methodology needs less communication overhead to attain privacy of around  $b=12$  bits in comparison with the sender simulation methodology. The explanation is that the sender simulation methodology is organized to support time period applications with a time interval tenth part the length of that used in the periodic assortment methodology.

It notice that the value of the proxy-based filtering (PFS) technique [29] lies between the prices of the periodic assortment technique and also the (theoretical) Steiner tree-based technique. However, each of our ways even have benefits over PFS. First, throughout simulation of PFS technique, it detected that around seventy p.c of events were received by the bottom station. However, for the periodic assortment methodology, the detection rate will be as high as ninety nine p.c. Second, the sender simulation theme will give sensible tradeoffs between location privacy and communication value. It will clearly see that the sender simulation plan are able to do a much better detection rate once the privacy demand is  $b=6$  or fewer bits.

It may see the performance of those techniques in comparison to the approximate Steiner tree algorithmic rule. For achieving the most privacy, the periodic assortment technique consumes a lot of energy than the approximate Steiner tree algorithmic rule. The reason is that, within the periodic assortment theme, every detector

emits a packet each seconds, whereas within the approximate Steiner tree algorithmic rule, every detector emits a packet once each seconds, as is that the case with a true sender .

## Receiver Location Privacy

### Receiver Simulation

The analysis within the location privacy achieved and also the quantity of energy consumed by the receiver simulation theme rely on the amount of faux base stations simulated within the network. The packets generated by the senders are sent to all or any pretend and real base stations. Hence, the main target of our simulation analysis is on the latency and also the packet drop rate once there are multiple base stations within the field. Fig. seven shows the latency of packet delivery once there are multiple pretend base stations within the field. It will see that because the variety of faux base stations will increase, there by providing a lot of location privacy, the latency will increase. This is often as a result of having a lot of base stations causes a lot of traffic within the network and therefore a lot of packets to be buffered. Once the amount of faux base stations grows overlarge, the buffered packets begin being born owing to nodes' restricted queue sizes, whereas the latency of the packets that do attain the bottom station becomes stable when an explicit purpose. Once the Queue size  $q$  decreases, packets traveling long distances have a high likelihood of obtaining born, creating the latency of the packets that do attain the important base station smaller. This will be seen by a call in the latency for smaller values of  $Q$ . It shows the share of detected events received by the important base station. It see that the share of events received decreases once there are a lot of pretend base stations within the field. It offer pointers for configuring the Queue size  $q$  and also the variety of faux base stations to satisfy varied necessities.

## Backbone Flooding

The location privacy achieved by the backbone flooding approach will increase with the amount of backbone members. Packets generated by a sender are sent to all or any backbone members. Hence, the main target of our simulation analysis is on the delivery latency, the packet drop rate, and also the energy needed for backbone creation.

It shows that increasing the backbone size can cause a lot of energy to be consumed. It additionally see that a rise within the parameter  $m$ , the mincover, can result in more backtracking within the backbone creation and thence consume a lot of energy.

It shows that the latency of packet delivery will increase as the dimensions of the backbone increases. This

is often as a result of a rise within the backbone size can cause a rise in the variety of packets within the network, inflicting buffering of a lot of packets and a corresponding increase in latency.

It shows the share of the detected events received by the bottom station. It will see that the share of events received decreases once there are a lot of backbone members within the field. It has to be compelled to create trade-offs between the latency and also the packet drop rate to satisfy varied necessities.

### Comparison

It judges the planned receiver-location privacy approaches. It focuses on the location privacy achieved and the communication overhead introduced by every technique.

In terms of privacy, it has already shown that none of the previous ways will give location privacy underneath the idea of a worldwide snooper. In distinction, each of the ways give receiver-location privacy against a worldwide snooper.

It compares the communication overheads through simulation. Each technique will give sensible trade-offs between privacy and communication value. It notes that backbone flooding consumes less energy. The explanation is that this methodology doesn't incur a lot of value to come up with traffic toward the pretend base stations. One air of packets within the backbone effectively creates several pretend base stations. It notes that each the approximate Steiner tree and backbone flooding techniques are step curves as a result of one packet transmission will be received by all neighbors of the sender. All of the neighbors will be considered by the adversary to be equally likely to be a real base station. Hence, the energy consumption can stay an equivalent for privacy within the vary.

In seeing the impact of multiple real base stations on communication value for the specified level of location privacy, every sender sends each packet to each base station. It indiscriminately places the 2 base stations within the network. The communication value of backbone flooding doubles once the amount of base stations doubles. This is often as a result of, by design, the sender communicates with every backbone severally. However, the Steiner tree algorithmic rule solely incurs a little increase in communication value. It will see that once built the approximate Steiner within the case of multiple base stations, the communication value remains constant till the privacy demand grows higher than seven bits. This is often as a result of the packets from a sender can forever undergo an equivalent ten hops and these ten hops could as several sensors for concerning seven bits of privacy.

### Discussion on Exploitation the Planned Techniques

The planned location privacy techniques during this paper have benefits and drawbacks in comparison with one another. It concisely summarizes our understanding of that solutions ought to be used for various applications. The periodic assortment and sender simulation ways will be used for providing sender-location privacy. The periodic assortment methodology provides the best location privacy and is thence helpful once watching extremely valuable objects. To boot, the communication cost—though high—does not increase with the amount of monitored objects. Thus, it's suitable for applications that collect data at an occasional rate from the network about many objects. The sender simulation methodology provides a trade-off between privacy and communication prices. It's appropriate for eventualities wherever 1) the article movement pattern will be properly sculptural and 2) ought to collect time period information from the network concerning the objects.

The receiver simulation and backbone flooding ways will give location privacy for the receivers. The backbone flooding methodology is clearly a lot of appropriate for the cases wherever a high level of location privacy is required. However, once the specified level of location privacy is below an explicit threshold, the receiver simulation methodology becomes a lot of enticing, since it's a lot of sturdy to node failure within the network. Within the backbone flooding plan, it ought to forever keep the backbone connected and construct the backbone from time to time to balance the communication costs between nodes.

### Conclusions

It previous work on location privacy in detector networks assumed a native snooper. This assumption is false given a well-funded, extremely driven offender within the location privacy problems underneath a worldwide snooper and calculable the minimum average communication overhead required to attain a given level of privacy. It additionally bestowed techniques to produce location privacy to things and receivers against a worldwide snooper. It used analysis and simulation to show however well these techniques perform in dealing with a world snooper. There are variety of directions that worth studying within the future. It assumes that the world snooper doesn't compromise detector nodes. However, in follow, the world snooper is also ready to compromise a set of the detector nodes within the field and perform traffic analysis with extra information from insiders. It presents attention-grabbing challenges to our ways. Second, it takes time for the observations created by the

adversarial network to achieve the mortal for analysis and reaction.

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